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Abstract Far from reopening classic debates on EU modes of governance, this special
issue uses the governance notion as an organizing concept in order to examine the gov-
erning of the EU in times of crisis. More speciﬁcally, we argue that focusing on modes of
governance contributes to the understanding of ‘where the power lies in the EU system’
especially when an external shock – such as the crisis – hits the EU governance system.
A systematic investigation is not possible given the limitation on space, but this intro-
ductory article highlights some of the aspects that we consider have been at the heart of
the new political challenges to the EU. Our main hypothesis is that the 2008 crisis has
offered a new opportunity for the intergovernmental mode of decision-making to prevail,
left marginal space for further including citizens in decision-making processes and has
provided a very narrow deﬁnition of effectiveness. This change of context calls for a
re-examination of forms of governing in the EU, and more speciﬁcally the so-called
‘softening narrative’, in order to go beyond a mere distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’
law and focus more on the governing processes that are in place in various institutional
and policy areas.
Comparative European Politics advance online publication, 23 February 2015;
doi:10.1057/cep.2015.6
Keywords: modes of governance; hard law; soft law; European Union; crisis
The study of European Union (EU) governance, how it operates and who contributes
to it, is essential to our understanding of the functioning of this political system.
This is particularly true in the aftermath of the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis, which deeply
challenged existing forms of decision-making and redistribution mechanisms
© 2015 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1472-4790 Comparative European Politics 1–19
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(Streeck and Schäfer, 2013). Possibly, the EU has never been so effective in
imposing decisions on member states and societies. In this critical context, the long-
term structuring impact of the policy tools and modes of governance that had been
introduced in order to deﬁne a new approach to governance were made visible. By
exploring this initial assumption both theoretically and empirically, this special issue
sheds new light on current debates regarding the impact of the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis
on EU governance. Following the 2001White Paper on European Governance, a series
of new modes of governance and policy tools have been designed and implemented
across EU policy domains in order to address simultaneously the problem-solving
capacity of EU institutions and the need to strengthen the participation of civil society
(Héritier and Rhodes, 2011). Managerial reforms within the EU Commission and
policies justiﬁed the need for softer modes of governance such as regulatory networks,
benchmarking and tools through which policy and state performance could be
measured and compared. By providing more participative and negotiated ways of
decision-making, these softer modes of governance increased the political and
administrative governability of the EU (Coletti and Radaelli, 2013); yet, which actors
and organizations beneﬁted most from this new governance approach as well as its
contribution to increasing the system’s political accountability and democratic legiti-
macy remains a contested issue (Bellamy, 2011). The supposed superiority of new
modes of governance – in terms of both inclusiveness and effectiveness – has been
hotly debated in the EU literature. Following the changes brought since the 2008 crisis
to the socio-economic and the ﬁscal governance regimes, these softer modes of
governance have developed into harder, more coercive forms of decision-making, thus
justifying the need to re-examine the ‘softening narrative’, which dominated academic
and practitioners’ debates about EU governance over the past 15 years.
Far from reopening classic debates on EU modes of governance, this special issue
uses the governance notion as an organizing concept in order to examine the governing
of the EU in times of crisis. More speciﬁcally, we argue that focusing on modes of
governance contributes to the understanding of ‘where the power lies in the EU
system’ especially when an external shock – such as the crisis – hits the EU governance
system. In our analysis, looking at ‘power’ implies looking at inﬂuence, that is, the
capacity of actors to obtain decisions that are in line with their speciﬁc preferences.
This introductory article highlights some of the aspects that we consider have been at
the heart of the new political challenges to the EU in terms of governance. But before
we turn to the discussion of such traits, we will brieﬂy situate our analysis in the
broader (and ‘classic’) spectrum of the studies on European integration.
The Debate on EU Integration: New Challenges
Scholars of European integration have always been interested in how the
European political organization was governed. Since the early debates between
Graziano and Halpern
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neofunctionalists and intergovernmentalists, one of the main key research questions
was – to put it simply – who was governing what today has become the EU. Was
decision-making primarily in the hands of a supranational body (the European
Commission alone ﬁrst, in combination with the European Parliament later) or in the
governmental representatives formally in command European decision-making?
Although decades have passed since the ﬁrst studies were conducted, the research
question remains crucial in order to assess power relations within the EU.
More recently, this question has been explored through different perspectives
(Saurugger, 2014). This large body of literature progressively shifted from a research
question on the nature of the EU (What is the EU?) to a question regarding the way
through which integration occurred (How does EU integration evolve?), thus
increasingly focusing on the functioning and the governing of the EU understood as
a hybrid political system (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger, 2006; Benz and Dose, 2010).
Drawing on extensive theoretical and empirical ﬁndings, the existing work has
supported the need for new conceptualization or the relevance of traditional political
analysis tools (Political Science, Comparative Politics). By looking more closely at
the dynamics of EU integration, these studies hoped to deepen their understanding of
the EU as a political system, seen primarily as an outcome that needed further
characterization. In other words, exploring EU integration process was and still is
another way to ask whether or not EU institutions, as a governing body and rule-
making authority, have beneﬁted or not from the accumulation of resources vis-à-vis
Member States.
Following the work done by a ﬁrst generation of EU scholars that focused on the
role of law and EJC rulings as a main integration factor, a second generation of EU
scholars became increasingly interested in softer integration modes, understood here
as less hierarchical in nature but with the potential of effectiveness and democratiza-
tion (Cini and Rhodes, 2007). Indeed, and in connection with the evolution and
expansion of the EU, a new wave of studies focussing on ‘new modes of governance’
has tried to look even more deeply into such topic by examining alternative and
innovative ways of decision-making in the EU. For example, one of the most
explored ‘new modes of governance’ has focused on sectoral governance where a
limited space (‘the shadow of hierarchy’) has been left for public institutions, be they
intergovernmental settings or supranational ones (Héritier and Lehmkuhl, 2008).
More in general, the ‘new modes of governance’ literature has highlighted – to some
degree following the neoinstitutionalist turn in European studies (Saurugger, 2014) –
the fact that governance settings are much more relevant than discussed both in the
intergovernmentalist and in the neofunctionalist perspective in understanding who
the major actors are in EU decision-making. We could also add that understanding
the ‘new modes of governance’ requires us to take into consideration the changes
introduced by the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, especially with reference to the increased
co-decision powers for the European Parliament (for a critical assessment, see Burns
et al, 2013; Hosli et al, 2013; Lord, 2013).
EU governance in times of crisis
3© 2015 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1472-4790 Comparative European Politics 1–19
  
 
 
 
 
AU
TH
OR
 CO
PY
Beyond the assessment of the institutional balances, the new modes of governance
literature has also tried to focus on the analysis of emerging forms of self-regulation
(Héritier and Lehmkuhl, 2008, 2011) and greater involvement of citizens in EU
decision-making, often however not reaching conclusive ﬁndings, focusing therefore
more on the notion on innovativeness rather than inclusiveness (Kröger, 2009).
Furthermore, the ‘new modes of governance’ literature focused on speciﬁc policy
tools and instruments. They mapped out the way in which, since the early 1990s, the
governing of the EU had been characterized by a growing diversity in forms of policy
making. More speciﬁcally, after a decade of innovations and new policy develop-
ments, from a political perspective the introduction of new types of ‘modes of
governance’ aimed at both rationalizing public policies and democratizing forms of
policy making has become a central issue in EU policy making (Jordan and
Schout, 2006). Extensive work was done on a series of meta-instruments of
coordination, in the sense given by Hood (2007), whose introduction aimed at
increasing coordination when other mechanisms had failed. Such tools (for example,
organization charts, framework agreements, Open Method of Coordination (OMC),
the Bologna process, sectoral governance instruments, and so on), which are
characterized by their non-hierarchical nature, seek direct involvement from
a large variety of social groups and provide – at least in principle – new political
opportunities for EU institutions.
Summing up, the main focus of the literature on the ‘new modes of governance’
(Dehousse, 2004; Eberlein and Kerwer, 2004; Caporaso and Wittenbrinck, 2006;
Cini and Rhodes, 2007; Treib et al, 2007; Kröger, 2009; Héritier and Lehmkuhl,
2008; Héritier and Lehmkuhl, 2011) has been threefold: (i) providing a conceptual
and theoretical clariﬁcation; (ii) setting the links between the ‘new modes of
governance’ and political authority; (iii) assessing the operational and delegation
features of the ‘new modes of governance’.
Nevertheless, although increasing, the ‘new modes of governance’ literature has
recently shown signs of ‘fatigue’, owing to the difﬁculty in grasping analytically the
ever-changing nature of processes such as the OMC and (post-)Lisbon Strategy (such
as Europe 2020), and the persistence of key features of the ‘old’ Community Method
in current EU forms of governance. Furthermore, scholarly work also showed how
such political opportunities have not always increased the coordination capacity of
European institutions (again, in primis the European Commission), nor has the
decision-making process been effectively more open with respect to civil society
(Saurugger, 2014).
Notwithstanding the existing important contributions on the ‘new modes of
governance’, what seems to be still lacking in the academic debates is a comprehen-
sive analysis regarding broad political dimension, more speciﬁcally the inclusiveness
and the effectiveness dimensions, of such modes of governance. We understand the
notion of political dimension as the ability of EU institutions to act as legitimate
authorities in effectively regulating activities and groups, that is, to resolve conﬂicts,
Graziano and Halpern
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allocate resources ,and organize larger debates on purposes and coercion (Kooiman,
1993; Benz and Dose, 2010). In other words, we argue that focusing on modes of
governance, as a meso-level of analysis, contributes to the understanding of ‘where
the power lies in the EU system’. However, this requires a shift from a highly
contextualized understanding of modes of governance that was grounded in the
somewhat normative and academic debates regarding the innovative dimension of
modes of governance (Bellamy and Castiglione, 2003, 2013; Papadopoulos and
Warin, 2007; Bellamy, 2011), toward a more analytic understanding of the notion,
which needs to be grounded in speciﬁc sub-dimensions such as inclusiveness and
effectiveness. In other words and following Treib et al (2007, p. 2) we suggest
abandoning the novelty dimension in order to focus on the more narrow political
dimensions of new modes of governance. Indeed, the debate between ‘old’ and ‘new’
has little analytic value. Similarly, we reject the narrative according to which there is
a growing tendency to introduce soft modes of governance, that is, non-hierarchical
rules and norms, as opposed to classic modes of governance. Rather, we assume the
continuous blurring between hard and soft, in which imposition and direct decision-
making softens increasingly, while soft modes of governance, such as persuasion,
naming and shaming, incentives and so on, become harder and prove more or less
innovative and effective under speciﬁc circumstances. To be sure, this does not lead
us to discard completely the question of how different ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ modes
of governance may be, but simply we focus rather on the everlasting coexistence
of these modes and focus on the political dimension of governance in terms of
inclusiveness and effectiveness. Although we share the idea raised by Sabel and
Zeitlin (2008, 2010) that innovation in EU governance lays the combination of
existing policy tools and instruments, we do however, question their pragmatist
approach to power as diffuse and dynamic. Exploring the political dimension of
governance in terms of both inclusiveness and exclusiveness contributes to the
understanding of where the power lies in the EU system. To be sure, conceptually,
effectiveness and inclusiveness can be strongly related (depending on the deﬁnitions,
see below), but empirically the two notions may be decoupled or very loosely
coupled. In other words, we posit that – although often coupled also in the political
discourses of EU institutions – inclusiveness and effectiveness may be quite different
in reality. For this reason, we leave the question of their relationship open and ask the
authors of the various contributions to this special issue to answer it.
Finally, we are less interested in the design of such tools than in their implementa-
tion and long-term effects in terms of both democratization and rationalization.
More speciﬁcally, we believe that a greater understanding of the impact of the new
forms of governance on democratization (speciﬁcally in terms of inclusiveness)
and rationalization (in terms of effectiveness). Indeed, we assume that a shift in the
way power is exerted at EU level may have a speciﬁc impact on EU integration
process and EU governing in terms of providing legitimation, inclusiveness and
effectiveness.
EU governance in times of crisis
5© 2015 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1472-4790 Comparative European Politics 1–19
  
 
 
 
 
AU
TH
OR
 CO
PY
The Crisis and Its Challenges to EU Governance
Our main hypothesis is that the 2008 crisis has offered a new opportunity for the
intergovernmental mode of decision-making to prevail, left marginal space for
further including citizens in decision-making processes and has provided a very
narrow deﬁnition of effectiveness (Streeck and Schäfer, 2013). This has been made
possible by the increasing predominance of economic multi-level governance, which
has increasingly shaped the relationship of almost all other European policies and
measures. Additional support in favor of such policy and instrumentation choices
was justiﬁed in the name of austerity understood as both a set of policies and an
ideology (Blyth, 2013; see also CEP symposium, 2013). To begin with, from a legal
perspective, in analyzing reforms to EU law and institutional structure – such as the
establishment of the ESM, the growing inﬂuence of the European Council and the
creation of a stand-alone Fiscal Compact – it can be argued that such reforms ‘are
likely to have a lasting impact on the ability of the EU to mediate conﬂicting interests
in all three areas. By undermining its constitutional balance, the response to the crisis
is likely to dampen the long-term stability and legitimacy of the EU project’ (Dawson
and de Witte, 2013). Clearly, legal analysis must be also tested by empirical research,
but we argue that as a starting point there is legalistic evidence concerning a broad
reorientation of EU decision-making more in line with an accentuation of the powers
of (some) Member States on European supranational institutions such as the
European Commission and the European Parliament. As a result, we believe this
change of context calls for a re-examination of forms of governing in the EU, and
more speciﬁcally the so-called ‘softening narrative’, in order to go beyond a mere
distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law and focus more on the governing processes
which are in place in various institutional and policy areas.
For such purpose, we suggest to introduce an analytic distinction between three
following notions: policy tools or instruments, modes of governance, and regimes of
governance. This will help us deepen our ability to highlight the typical properties of
governing modes at EU level rather than refer to their ﬁrst introduction in a speciﬁc
empirical context and therefore understand broader regularities of such governing
modes beyond their empirical speciﬁcation (Howlett, 2011, p. 54). More speciﬁcally,
we deﬁne the three notions as follow:
1. Policy tools or instruments can be deﬁned as a set of governing techniques
(budgets, practices, norms and standards) that are often dissociated from the
political game. Yet, the rationales at work in the choice and selection of the
concrete modalities through which policy objectives are made operational, like
other processes of implementation or evaluation, are deeply political both in their
elaboration and in their effects (Lascoumes and Le Galès, 2007). In this special
issue we focus on the effects of policy tools understood in terms of both
inclusiveness and effectiveness.
Graziano and Halpern
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2. Modes of governance refer to the way through which different types of policy
instruments – often pertaining to both binding, sanctioning tools and persuasive,
informative tools – are combined with one another at EU level in order to both
constrain and enable collective action and the setting of common goals. By narrow-
ing the deﬁnition of modes of governance to the interplay of policy instruments, we
go beyond the static view of hard versus soft law and try to test whether there has
been convergence (or not) through policy areas in terms of instrument combination
and/or their outcome in terms of inclusiveness and effectiveness.
3. Regime of governance, understood as a set of arrangements that ensures power
allocation among EU institutions and Member States. This notion helps us in
characterizing the EU’s political ability to produce a basic form of social order
(Mayntz, 2003), by effectively regulating activities and groups according to
evolving relationships between EU institutions and member states on the one
hand, and between public and private actors on the other hand (Kohler-Koch and
Eising, 1999; Benz and Papadopoulos, 2006). In other words, we ask where the
power lies in the EU system, by focusing on the way in which groups and
activities are politically regulated (or not). More speciﬁcally, by focusing on the
inclusiveness and effectiveness dimensions, we are interested in both the
governing and the governability of the EU (Kassim and Le Galès, 2010).
We believe that this special issue provides a comprehensive analysis of why and
how the continuous blurring between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ shapes the inclusiveness and
the effectiveness of EU forms of governance. Indeed, the context of the crisis has
further put under pressure the existing modes of governance by requiring more tight
supranational control over EU policy implementation (Schmidt and Thatcher, 2013;
Crespy and Ravinet, 2014). Policy tools aiming at rationalizing public policies,
investments and programmes (that is, impact assessment, better governance, and so
on.) have been systematically introduced (Coletti and Radaelli, 2013). They
contribute over time to reorganizing the functioning of the EU both substantially
and procedurally. Recent negotiations on the next programming period (2014–2020),
and the setting of policy priorities in preparation of Europe 2020, show how such
rationalizing policy instruments shape evolving relationships in the EU, both
vertically and horizontally. Indeed, the papers gathered in this special issue illustrate
the constant interplay between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’, rather than opposition between two
clearly demarcated approaches to exerting power and constraint. In a large number of
policy areas, new modes of governance are increasingly used in close combination
with traditional ‘harder’ modes of governance. The recourse to sanctioning and
disciplining takes over another major priority, namely to further democratize the EU
policy. This process does not rely on the introduction of new policy instruments as
such, but rather it shows how the systematic combination between old and new
modes of governance creates additional opportunities for intergovernmentalist
tendencies.
EU governance in times of crisis
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Such phenomenon has wider implications for the understanding of EU integration,
as suggested by the intertwining of three mechanisms through which power is
exerted: ﬁrst, the recourse to hard mechanisms, such as sanction and norms, that are
imposed through direct decision-making; second, the use of softer mechanisms that
prove more effective in some cases in order to persuade and convince actors to
comply with given rules and norms; and third, learning as a major mechanism of
power that shapes evolving relationships between EU institutions and member states.
In the following sections of this article, we situate the special issue by focussing on
the challenges on the ongoing relevance – even more so in the wake of the economic
and ﬁnancial crisis – of the neglected dimensions of the ‘new modes of governance’
literature: inclusiveness and effectiveness.
Inclusiveness
Together with the effectiveness dimension, inclusiveness has traditionally been a
concern for both EU policy makers and scholars (Metz, 2014). More speciﬁcally, due
to the speciﬁc and quite unique setting of the EU multilevel political system, the aim
of an inclusive EU has been on the political agenda at least since the introduction of
direct election of the European Parliament in 1979 and even more relevant after
Maastricht (Kröger and Friedrich, 2013). Together with the European Parliament, the
European Commission has increasingly been concerned with inclusiveness issues, as
the White Paper on European Governance (2001) clearly stated: ‘Today, political
leaders throughout Europe are facing a real paradox. On the one hand, Europeans
want them to ﬁnd solutions to the major problems confronting our societies. On the
other hand, people increasingly distrust institutions and politics or are simply not
interested in them. The problem is acknowledged by national parliaments and
governments alike. It is particularly acute at the level of the European Union. Many
people are losing conﬁdence in a poorly understood and complex system to deliver
the policies that they want. The Union is often seen as remote and at the same time
too intrusive.’ (European Commission, 2001, p. 3). The European Commission
identiﬁed ﬁve key areas (of principles of ‘good governance’), which would have
contributed to solving the ‘loss of conﬁdence’ in EU institutions: openness,
participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence. In policy terms, the
following decade has been a period that has been labeled as a ‘participatory turn’
(Saurugger, 2010), which was characterized by the fact that EU decision-making had
to be more accessible to civil society and be only secluded to institutional relation-
ships (Saurugger, 2010, p. 483).
Even prior to the empirical analysis of inclusiveness, what seems to be lacking in
the overall debate regarding the inclusiveness of EU decision-making, however, is a
clear distinction between types of inclusion. For example, scholars such as König and
Bräuninger (1998) have been primarily interested in the inclusion of institutional
Graziano and Halpern
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actors such as the European Parliament, whereas others have focused on the inclusion
of non-institutional actors such as civil society representatives (Saurugger, 2010;
Quittkat, 2011). Overall, the empirical evidence shows that – although increasing
inclusiveness has occurred formally – in more substantial terms the picture is much
more nuanced.
In order to better focus on the inclusiveness dimensions, we suggest that a clear
distinction among types of inclusion must be made. Such a distinction would allow
us to better understand differences between formal (in its two variants, institutional
and non-institutional) and substantive inclusiveness. Institutional formal inclusive-
ness regards the openness of institutional decision-making. The key actors are EU
decision-making institutions, that is, the Council of European Ministers, the
European Commission and the European Parliament. Beyond neofunctionalist or
intergovernmentalist accounts of European integration, there is sufﬁcient shared
consensus that EU decision-making has increasingly been open via the transforma-
tion of the European Parliament as a full co-legislator: in the words of Rittberger, ‘[b]
estowed with only a few nominal powers at the outset, the EP has undergone a
remarkable process of institutional empowerment’ (Rittberger, 2012, p. 18). This
empowerment may not make the European Parliament fully equal to the Council of
European Ministers (Costello and Thompson, 2013), but still it signals a changing
power balance within the institutional functioning of the EU. Put differently, in
institutional terms the inclusiveness of the EU has clearly gone a long way in the
development of European integration – even though the crisis seems to have boosted
intergovernmental power within most recent patterns of EU decision-making. From
the civil society (that is, formal non-institutional), inclusiveness has also increased
signiﬁcantly over the past decade although we should be aware of the fact that
‘discursive agreement [on the inclusion of civil society] does not entail that there
exists a homogenous entity that one could label “civil society”, or that the principle of
the participative standard is universally applied’ (Saurugger, 2010, p. 489). For these
and other caveats which will be derived from the empirical ﬁndings presented in this
special issue, we would claim that formal (or procedural) inclusiveness has been
granted over the past decade to civil society organizations, that is, to well-organized
and -established organizations that claim to act in the name and in the interest of
society as opposed to citizens themselves (Kohler-Koch, 2008; see also Boussaguet
in this special issue). This feature seems to be even more true in the light of the
European governance of the crisis, which has offered greater opportunities for
intergovernmentalist decision-making (Dawson and de Witte, 2013) and, conse-
quently, limited the space of intervention for both supranational institutions and civil
society actors. Less evidence can be found of a substantive (and generalized)
empowerment of civil society – although some recent data has cast some doubts on
the more conventional interpretation that business interests are stronger than
collective interests (Dür et al, 2013). Also, the case studies presented in this special
issue provide interesting evidence that substantive inclusiveness has been
EU governance in times of crisis
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particularly limited since – as in the case of the OMC – procedural participation has
expanded the most. Put differently, the ‘participatory turn’ of EU governance seems
to be better applied to formal inclusiveness rather than to substantive inclusiveness.
And, as the articles in this special issue show, the responses to the crisis further
limited the reach of inclusion – reducing also formal (both institutional and non-
institutional) inclusiveness.
Effectiveness
Since the White Paper on Governance, also effectiveness has been a key word within
the redeﬁnition of the European institutions’ role in the EU multilevel political
system. More speciﬁcally, the effectiveness dimension represented a key feature of
the so-called ‘output legitimacy’ or ‘output democracy’ model, which, according to
some authors (Scharpf, 1999), characterizes the European Union. But where lies the
effectiveness problem within the EU? In principle, we should distinguish between two
types of effectiveness: policy effectiveness and political effectiveness. The ﬁrst type of
effectiveness is linked to the need that the policies designed, adopted and implemented
at the EU level are effective in the sense that they are (at least) producing the expected
results; the second, broader type of effectiveness is linked to the legitimacy needs of the
EUmultilevel political system, following the understanding that EU institutions will be
politically effective when the overall support (‘legitimacy’) within the affected political
community is favorable. More speciﬁcally, with respect to policy effectiveness, the
European institutions, and the European Commission in particular, have the task to
cover 28 member states and oversee policy formulation and implementation, which is
applied to over 500 million EU citizens. AsMetz rightly notices, ‘[o]ften policy makers
do not possess sufﬁcient in-house expertise to formulate adequate problem solutions
(…). [T]his (…) is particularly pronounced in the European Union, where governing
institutions are both highly understaffed and geographically detached from domestic
settings to which EU regulation applies’ (Metz, 2014, p. 263). EU institutions tried to
mobilize external expertise in order to ﬁll knowledge gaps, and this resulted in the so-
called ‘committee system’ (with over 1000 expert groups assembling more than 30 000
experts, advising especially the less-than-23 000 staff of the European Commission
(Metz, 2014, p. 264). However, the role of experts is ambiguous in terms of potential
power unbalances since they may be strategically used by the Commission (Rimkuté
and Haverland, 2013) or some experts may systematically prevail over others (Metz,
2014) and often there is a strong bais in their selection (ALTER-EU, AK Europa and
ŐGB Europabűro, 2013). To be sure, this ambiguity regards rather the nature of
inclusiveness and openness of EU decision-making and not the capacity to reach the
ﬁxed policy goals.
Therefore, we shall focus on the latter, knowing that a general analysis of EU
policy making is out of the reach of this contribution. For our purposes, it should
Graziano and Halpern
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sufﬁce to say that policy effectiveness depends heavily on the policy sector – and
both horizontal and vertical power relations within that sector – and over the past
years policy effectiveness concerns have been particularly relevant in terms of
responding to the economic crisis via the tightening of domestic budgetary
constraints rather than ﬁxing more ambitious goals in other policy areas – such as
social policy. Put differently, policy effectiveness has overridden the search for
political effectiveness, especially in a context of austerity during which the increased
shrinking of public authorities’ discretionary power further restrains their redistribu-
tive capacity (Streeck and Schäfer, 2013).
Although we shall see in the various contributions to this special issue how policy
effectiveness has varied, we consider political effectiveness more relevant since it
regards the political system as such and does not merely pertain to speciﬁc policy
sectors. In this respect, the systemic attempt to obtain ‘output legitimacy’ in an
overall context characterized by limited ‘input legitimacy’ (Scharpf, 1999) seems to
be even more salient since it can tell us something about how European integration is
perceived by the potential beneﬁciaries of its overall functioning – the members of
the EU political community – beyond speciﬁc policy sectors of which large parts of
the populations may not even be aware of. Furthermore, ‘system effectiveness’ has
been a greater concern for scholars of democracy beyond the EU (Dahl, 2004),
providing stronger scientiﬁc legitimacy to our selective choice. It allows linking the
debate on spaces of modes of governance together with a larger debate on the EU
integration process.
In order to measure the political effectiveness of the EU we consider two indicators
as particularly relevant: voter turnout and trust in the EU (as measured by the
standard Eurobarometer questionnaire). The ﬁrst is a crude indicator of how
important EU institutions are perceived, the second is a less crude indicator of the
levels of trust in EU institutions. We are well aware of the relative inaccuracy of the
indicators, but for the moment no valid alternative of ‘system’ or political effective-
ness operationalization seems to be in sight. In terms of voter turnout, the trend has
been increasingly negative: from 62 per cent in 1979 to slightly more than 43 per cent
in 2014. Breaking down the data, it is even more striking that with the exception of
Latvia and Estonia all the other new Central-Eastern members underperformed with
respect to the EU average – and after the crisis exploded voter turnout has diminished
also in ‘old’ member states. If we turn to the level of trust, the past ten years have
witnessed a rapid decline in the overall trust – from 42 per cent of EU citizens who
‘tend(ed) to trust’ EU institutions in 2003 to 29 per cent in 2013 (Figure 1), and from
42 per cent who ‘tend(ed) not to trust’ to 58 per cent in 2013. Also in this case, after
the crisis exploded trust has further declined (see Figure 1) – although causal links are
difﬁcult to pin down in general terms (whereas for more speciﬁc policy-based
accounts, see the various contributions to this special issue).
Clearly, we are not supporting any causal inference, nor are we trying to link
policy effectiveness and political effectiveness, but for the purposes of our discussion
EU governance in times of crisis
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on the missing (or underdeveloped) dimensions of analysis with respect to the
governance debate we think that these indicators are more than evocative. In other
terms, we consider that a systematic consideration of the effectiveness dimension –
and not primarily the policy dimension but rather the political one – needs to be
assessed when EU governance is scrutinized. In the various articles of the special
issue we will deal more speciﬁcally with policy effectiveness, but in this introductory
article we wanted to devote speciﬁc attention to the importance of ‘system’ or
‘political’ effectiveness as a crucial yardstick which allows us to better understand
how the past decade has changed the relationship between the governance actors
(especially EU institutions) and the potential beneﬁciaries of their activity (the
members of the EU political community). Notwithstanding the ‘new modes of
governance’, ‘system’ or ‘political effectiveness’ has signiﬁcantly declined over the
past decade.
The Governance Mix: Overview of the Findings Presented in the Special
Issue
By bringing together scholars currently conducting research on different dimensions
of EU governance, this special issue examines the evolving role of modes of
governance in shaping the governing of the EU and the mechanism through which
power is exerted at EU level. We focus more speciﬁcally on the challenges that the
crisis has posed to both the neglected dimensions of the ‘new modes of governance’
Figure 1: Trust in EU’s institutions (1985–2010).
Graziano and Halpern
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literature: inclusiveness and effectiveness. The ﬁndings of the case studies are
considered in the following section in relation to the sets of questions outlined above.
Although it is not possible to pursue all the lines of inquiry suggested, the cases offer
many important insights.
Going beyond the softening narrative offers new understandings of the EU and the
way through which mixed, multi-faceted forms of governance have emerged over
time and more particularly following the crisis. In several instances, the contributors
assembled here challenge accepted wisdoms in the existing literature. Dehousse and
Falkner demonstrate the weak explanatory role of the softening narrative in order to
highlight shifts of power in the EU. Not only do they empirically demonstrate the
continued blurring between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’, but they also suggest to focus more on
existing governing processes in order to map out their restructuring in a context of
crisis. In its discussion of recent evidence from EU legislative activity, Dehousse
critically re-examines the shift to ‘new governance’. He shows that in strategic areas
such as economic policy coordination or banking regulation, the severity of the
ﬁnancial crisis has resulted in a tightening of European rules and in stronger control
mechanisms. Similarly, Falkner shows how the recent introduction of ﬁnes as a new
policy tool of EU law enforcement against member States results in weakening the
softening and the ‘innovativeness’ narratives.
Going beyond an understanding of resistances as forms of non-compliance,
Saurugger and Terpan provide further evidence on the continued blurring between
hard and soft law. They argue that resistance to soft law is as frequent as that to hard
law – even if less empirically observable – thus conﬁrming the policy effectiveness
of soft law and the profound changes in governance structures and power allocation it
may lead to over time. Interestingly, they make the case that increasing resistances to
EU law should not be understood in terms of un-governability but rather as a proof of
its growing normalization and acceptance as an effective rule-making authority.
Another ﬁnding shared by many of the contributors is that shifts of power in the
EU are by no means unidirectional. This has major implications for the literature on
the effectiveness of EU governance. It also contributes to current debates about if and
how the EU Commission has been a beneﬁciary of the crisis (Bickerton et al, 2014).
In spite of growing anti-European sentiments in the EU and increasingly assertive
governments, the strengthening of European rules – sometimes based on the strategic
usages of the ‘soft’ instruments at its disposal – has enhanced its authority across
policy domains (see Dehousse’s contribution). This is done by adding hierarchy and
increasing the sanctions attached with cross-sectoral and cross-national policy
performances. In this sense, the systematic use of collaborative, non-coercive and
informal modes of governance does not just result in the weakening of EU
institutions and governing capacity. Indeed, standardized measurement procedures,
detailed surveillance mechanisms and systematic assessment of national/sectoral
performance strengthen – in theory – the steering capacity of EU institutions over
member states and societies.
EU governance in times of crisis
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This process is most certainly detrimental to the European and member states’
Parliaments, but whether or not it beneﬁts the European Commission largely varies
from one case to the other as argued by Falkner. She shows that ‘the Commission
considers the opportunity to combine quite different instruments of great importance
in its efforts to ensure compliance with EU law’ (Falkner, in this special issue).
Taking a different view on non-compliance to EU law, Saurugger and Terpan argue
that the effectiveness of soft law is best understood in relationship with social – as
opposed to legal – sanctions, but proves no less effective in terms of the EU’s
governing capacity. In the case of ﬁnancial markets, Kudrna examines how evolving
forms of governance in the ﬁnancial market regulation domain led to hardening soft
modes of governance. Following the 2008 crisis, successive reforms strengthened the
role played by the EU level, through the continued reinforcing of independent
agencies and specialized committees. Yet, the process through which ‘the govern-
ance of the ﬁnancial market regulation in general and of banking in particular,
evolved from the most generic community method to a multi-level process centred
around independent agencies’ does not automatically beneﬁt to EU institutions – the
Commission, the Council and the Parliament – since these newly created bodies are
‘better positioned to balance disparate interests than either the Commission or
national authorities by virtue of combining both national and supranational points
of view.’ (Kudrna, in this special issue).
These results highlight the structuring effect of new modes of governance on the
EU governance regime, in terms of both its inclusiveness and its effectiveness. By
favouring increased institutional inclusiveness, these processes contribute to enhan-
cing the complexity of EU decision-making. They contribute to multiplying the
number of veto points and players, policy-making arenas and opportunities to resist
and circumvent EU norms and rules. Over time, the sedimentation of new modes of
governance and policy instruments also result in shifting policy priorities to the
detriment of inclusiveness. This is particularly true in times of crisis, during which
the functioning of existing modes of governance enhanced the EU’s policy
effectiveness. This is less true, however, with regard to political effectiveness, as
these ﬁndings also conﬁrm the political dimension of instrumentation choices.
Indeed, speciﬁc combinations of policy tools and the ability to seize – or not – the
opportunities expected from a given mode of governance does not result from an
automatic process alone, but is also shaped by politics. As shown by Falkner, in some
cases of large-scale and visible non-compliance, soft pressurizing may be more
effective than penalization and public shaming.
The ﬁndings also hold some implications for EU governance and democracy. They
empirically challenge the contribution of new modes of governance, such as impact
assessments, to redeﬁning the EU governance regime and enhancing the EU’s
democratic credentials. Some contributions do so by focusing on speciﬁc policy
instruments and their implementation over time, thus conﬁrming the widening gap
between increased forms of formal (especially institutional) inclusiveness and
Graziano and Halpern
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substantial inclusiveness. Focusing on impact assessments as one of the concrete
devices through which inclusiveness has been made operational at EU level, Bozzini
and Smismans explore the usages made by the European Commission’s DGs of this
mode of governance over time. They highlight different patterns of participation, and
why and how it was primarily understood by DGs as an opportunity to enhance
coordination by building intra-institutional relationships as opposed to ensuring
neutral expertise and increasing input legitimacy. They ﬁrst show that DGs tend to
include a limited amount of actors in impact assessments and the variations observed
depend less on the density of interest groups in a given policy ﬁeld than on processes
of learning within each DG. A related point, made by Boussaguet, concerns the
usages that were developed of the participatory instruments that were introduced at
EU level in order to enhance the inclusiveness of the decision-making system. Since
the early 2000s, a series of speciﬁc policy instruments such as citizens’ conferences,
deliberative polls, regular consultations and, last but not least, the European Citizens’
Initiative were introduced in order to include the ordinary citizen as opposed to the
organized civil society. Her ﬁndings conﬁrm the little use made of such policy
instruments by the ordinary citizen. Yet she also argues that the impact of such a
symbolic reform should be assessed less in terms of policy outputs or levels of
inclusiveness, but rather in terms of their political effectiveness since they demon-
strate the EU’s continued attempts to engage in a structured dialog with citizens.
Nevertheless, the evidence presented by Boussaguet conﬁrms that political effective-
ness is still lacking, notwithstanding the symbolic relevance of the new initiatives
aimed at increasing the inclusiveness dimensions.
By contrast, other contributors chose to focus on a speciﬁc policy domain and the
extent to which new modes of governance did contribute – or not – to increasing
institutional inclusiveness. Examining the case of ﬁnancial market regulation,
Kudrna provides some insights on the functioning of new modes of governance and
policy instruments in the context of the 2008 crisis. He argues that such forms of
cooperation prove less effective in these extreme circumstances, thus justifying
another governance reform that primarily relies on expert committees and indepen-
dent agencies. By opening additional space for policy coordination, new modes of
governance shaped a continued shift toward a more regulatory approach to ﬁnancial
market regulation and the emergence of a multi-level governance system in which
legitimacy is increasingly constrained by the expansion of technocratic policy-
making.
Conclusion
The focus on dimensions of inclusiveness and effectiveness brings out dimensions of
policy making that have hitherto remained hidden and highlights the characteristics
of the ways through which the EU is governed that have been relatively unexplored.
EU governance in times of crisis
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The governing of the EU is increasingly complex, that characteristic having been
considerably increased through the sedimentation of successive layers of new policy
tools and modes of governance. By opening successive space for interest mobiliza-
tion and representation, they did contribute to enhancing the institutional inclusive-
ness of the governance regime as a whole, as well as to the policy effectiveness in
some speciﬁc cases. However, their effects in terms of substantive inclusiveness and
political effectiveness appear to be extremely limited. This is particularly true since
the 2008 crisis, which appears to have led to the hardening of pre-existing sets of
policy tools and modes of governance as a way to increase coordination. From the
analytical point of view, the results presented in this special issue clearly show the
limits of the narratives that explained new directions in EU governance in terms of
their ‘softening’ and a ‘new governance’ approach. These analytic frameworks fail to
explain recent changes in the EU governance regime, inasmuch as they are unable to
explain the hardening of existing policy tools and the multiplication of autonomous
spaces. Focusing on policy tools, and analyzing the way they are combined –
somewhat uneasily – with one another in relation to the notions of inclusiveness and
effectiveness properly understood, offers fruitful avenues for the understanding of
the EU political system, the way and limitations of how it is governed.
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